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Excluded Actors in Patient Safety
Peter Lazes, Suzanne Gordon, and Sameh Samy
Diane Sommers is an ICU (intensive care unit) 
nurse at a major East Coast teaching hospital.1 Over the past few years her 
hospital has launched a number of pioneering safety initiatives: operating 
room and ICU checklists, efforts to reduce falls and infections, as well as 
safety meetings on individual patient care units. On the unit, a specific time 
is set aside each week so that staff can meet and learn about new safety meth­
ods, as well as discuss their concerns and insights. For Sommers, this has been 
a promising development. The problem, however, is that she and her col­
leagues have such a heavy workload caring for two intensely ill patients that 
they cannot regularly attend these patient safety meetings. Increasingly skep­
tical about her hospital’s commitment to the kind of ongoing staff input that 
is critical to improving patient safety, Sommers wonders: Why doesn’t hospi­
tal management adjust the nursing workload—just for an hour a week—so 
RNs like herself can contribute more effectively to patient safety efforts?
Beth Jones is an intravenous (IV) nurse at a Massachusetts teaching hospi­
tal. Although her hospital has implemented efforts to reduce central venous 
line infections, Jones is quite frustrated because these activities have not 
included the frontline staff responsible for placement of IVs. “We’ve had 
a really serious problem with central venous catheter [CVC] line infec­
tions. We have an awful lot of problems with PICC [peripherally inserted 
central catheter] lines. Management got together some nurses, infectious
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disease people, and doctors but left out the IV nurses, who are responsible for 
maintaining these lines and who’d complained about this problem for years. 
After all, we re the ones who take care of the central lines. I don’t know why 
they left us out. I can’t really figure it out. It’s like they don’t seem to think 
practitioners have valuable knowledge.”2
Rick Brooks is the executive director of Rhode Island United Nurses and 
Allied Professionals (UNAP), a union that represents nurses at Rhode Island 
Hospital and other institutions connected to Lifespan, the largest hospital 
network in the state. Lifespan is another hospital network that has signed on 
to various patient safety initiatives. For example, one of Lifespan’s physicians 
has partnered with an airline pilot to train staff in the kinds of teamwork 
lessons that have been essential to promoting safety in commercial avia­
tion. Although the union is an influential “stakeholder” in hospital culture, 
Lifespan administrators have never asked UNAP to encourage its members 
to attend such seminars. In fact, the first Brooks heard of these meetings 
was when one of the authors asked him about them. Brooks acknowledges 
that he and fellow union activists could be more proactive when it comes 
to patient safety, but adds that members tend to be quite cynical about hos­
pital safety initiatives. He explains, “Whenever union members identify 
workplace issues-—mandatory overtime, unsafe staffing, failure to utihze lift 
equipment when moving heavy patients or failure to empower staff to chal­
lenge surgeons who refuse to use operating room checklists—the hospital 
ignores their concerns.” When worker safety and patient safety intersect, says 
Brooks, “the hospital seems uninterested in pursuing either.”3
Pamela Brier is the CEO of Maimonides Medical Center in Brooklyn. 
Over the past several years, her institution has also initiated a variety of 
patient safety initiatives. One concerned hospital cleanliness; others focused 
on patient falls and medication errors. Another was triggered by prob­
lems in the cardiology program. Although initiatives that are taking place 
at Maimonides seem similar to those going on in other hospitals, there is 
a significant difference. Unlike top-down management- or physician-led 
patient safety initiatives in many other U.S. institutions, those at Maimonides 
have been developed, implemented, evaluated, and refined in partnership 
with the hospital’s three unions and led by frontline staff—not only RNs 
but also nursing aides, lab techs, and even cleaning staff. Brier feels that 
the inclusion of frontline staff and unions has transformed stalled efforts to 
make Maimonides a safer hospital, and she and her colleagues in the execu­
tive suite are committed to pursuing a bottom-up approach to patient safety.
These four anecdotes highlight one of the most significant issues related 
to the realization of the patient safety agenda in hospitals today. In the con­
temporary American hospital, when patient safety initiatives are planned and
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designed, this work is almost always done at the top. Physician leaders, safety 
champions, “green belts,” safety researchers, nurse managers, hospital admin­
istrators, outside consultants, patient safety advocacy groups, or hospital regu­
lators identify problems, craft solutions, design and plan initiatives, and/or 
issue mandates requiring their implementation. As initiatives move from top 
to bottom, managers are generally enlisted to encourage worker compliance. 
The evaluation and refinement of safety efforts also takes place with httle 
input from the front hnes of care—nursing, nursing assistants, cleaning, food 
services, and other hospital occupations. In a similar vein, in many hospitals 
in which unions represent a significant segment of the workforce, union 
leaders and activists are rarely enlisted as allies and may not even be notified 
about patient safety projects or plans.
Furthermore, when workers identify patient safety problems that target 
workload, equipment, supplies, or fatigue and worker safety and health— 
anything that involves the allocation of significant financial resources or 
involves significant changes in work organization—hospitals often turn a 
deaf ear to their concerns. When workers, particularly unionized workers, 
propose legislative, regulatory, or contractual remedies that could improve 
patient safety, hospitals generally Fight to defeat these efforts. Indeed, 
rather than allying with workers who have identified significant safety 
problems, administrators often perceive workers as adversaries rather than 
allies. When it comes to patient safety, there is also a disconnect between 
initiatives designed to make patients safer and those that also target the 
health and well-being of the hospital workforce. Although the two are 
intimately connected, in the modern patient safety movement and hos­
pitals’ responses to it, worker safety lies on one side of a very wide chasm 
that separates the health of hospital workers from that of the patients for 
whom they care.
In this chapter we explore this blind spot in the effort to make hos­
pitals safer, providing an argument for the inclusion of frontline workers 
and unions, analyzing some of the reasons for their exclusion from safety 
efforts, and suggesting a different model that would help strengthen safety 
activities.
Why Frontline Workers and Unions Matter
Including frontline workers in the full spectrum of patient safety initiatives 
is important for several reasons. While high-level buy-in is critical to patient 
safety, hospital culture is changed not only through dictates elaborated in 
the C suite (the hospital department where we find the offices of the chief 
executive and operations, finance, and nursing officers), or by experts and
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researchers at a patient safety conference, or on grand rounds, but also at 
the grass-roots level, where care is delivered and where the environment in 
which it is delivered is shaped: in the patient’s room, hospital corridor, nurses’ 
station, on-call room, laboratory, X-ray suite, or housekeepers’ locker room. 
The people who must carefully manipulate IV lines, administer medications, 
wash their hands before and after touching a patient, read tests correctly, 
keep hospital corridors and patients’ rooms clean, or make sure that a patient 
doesn’t die while being transported to or waiting for an X ray are also the 
people who can best help identify the problems they have doing these things 
safely and effectively. They are also the people who must help craft workable 
solutions as well as workable ways to implement and evaluate them. These 
staff have the implicit knowledge of what works and what doesn’t. If hospi­
tals are to learn from their mistakes and thus produce and sustain institution­
wide learning, the process of institutional transformation must be circular, 
not linear—from bottom to top and top to bottom in a continuous manner.4
Let’s look first at how patient safety problems are identified. Many 
researchers, policy experts, administrators, and managers have very accurate 
and innovative ideas about what is wrong in health care institutions and 
how to fix it. Safety initiatives must be supported by the top of the health 
care hierarchy and be implemented by—and overcome the resistance of— 
traditional medical elites. Higher-level administrators and middle manag­
ers have control over the resources that make change possible.5 They also 
have a lot of good ideas about what needs changing and how to change 
it. Nevertheless, many of the things that jeopardize patients are invisible to 
top management because they occur in what the great sociologist Erving 
Goffman called “backstage spaces” and involve backstage and often invisible 
health care workers. These are spaces that upper-level executives or manag­
ers (and sometimes even middle-level managers or physician leaders) rarely 
have access to because they spend very little time actually delivering patient 
care at the sites where care is delivered, or communicating directly with 
backstage workers. As the ones who deliver care or tend to the environment 
in which care is delivered, frontline workers are far more familiar with pro­
cesses of care delivery and infrastructural maintenance and can thus far more 
effectively identify aspects of patient care delivery that are unsafe. As Amy 
Edmondson has put it, “In hospitals senior managers often do not know 
which group has which culture, making it difficult to ascertain whether and 
when they are getting the true data on errors.”6
According to Carol Porter, director of nursing at Mount Sinai Hospital 
in New York City, “to create an effective patient safety process, frontline 
staff need to be involved, not just to assure compliance with major initiatives
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once they have been designed but to assure that the choice of initiatives, the 
strategies pursued, and plan for implementation and monitoring of activities 
include [them].”7 Porter found “it was impossible to improve patient safety 
in our hospital without the full involvement of frontline staff and the support 
of their unions. Past management refused to see these groups as allies and 
instead spent time fighting their involvement.”8
The renowned business professor Michael Porter (no relation to Carol) 
pointed out in an interview that institutions that have succeeded in creat­
ing a culture of safety have found ways to encourage and include frontline 
staff in the identification of safety problems without fear of reprisal. They 
not only involve staff in the design and implementation of appropriate and 
practical solutions but also, like other high-reliability industries (the aviation 
and chemical industries, for example), provide staff with the necessary time 
and resources to create, learn, and master new procedures and processes. 
Finally, they encourage staff to identify new problems that arise as solutions 
are rolled out. And, as Edmondson adds, they create an environment of psy­
chological safety so workers can identify problems without risk and suggest 
if and when safety efforts are not succeeding.9
Because “solutions” always create unintended problems, these industries 
involve frontline staff and management. These two groups are central to 
any effort to illuminate clearly the dynamic interaction between work orga­
nization and the allocation of financial resources to patient care and safety. 
Clarity around this issue is absolutely critical. When it comes to patient 
safety, the devil that can undermine the best of patient safety activities often 
lies in the details of work organization. Consider, for example, the effort 
to reduce the spread of hospital-acquired infections. When a hospitalized 
patient acquires an infection, it is important for all staff and visitors to put 
on a gown and gloves before entering the patient’s room. They must also 
discard them before exiting the room. To make sure that these procedures 
are followed consistently, not only RNs but also hospital cleaning, dietary, 
and any other staff who enter and exit a patient’s room must be carefully and 
recurrently trained in the proper infection control technique.
In one hospital we visited (a Magnet hospital that had won many other 
prestigious awards), one of us (Suzanne Gordon) watched closely as nurses 
gowned and gloved appropriately before entering a room and discarded their 
protective gear before exiting. A few minutes later, after the RN had left the 
room, a hospital cleaner entered, similarly gowned and gloved, and proceeded 
to clean the patient’s room. She, however, exited the room without discard­
ing her gown and gloves inside and then, in the hospital corridor, took them 
off and threw them into a garbage receptacle. As she was walking by just by
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chance, an RN chastised the aide for failing to execute patient safety precau­
tions correctly. The aide had not done this correctly because cleaners had 
been left out of the patient safety information loop and were not sufficiently 
educated about the entire infection control procedure.
In another hospital, Gordon and Ross Koppel observed a similar problem. 
Workers, if consulted early and often, can identify problems and obstacles 
in the way their work is structured, information communicated, and care 
planned. The following example illustrates this often ignored fact.
We know that one of the most effective infection control measures is 
also one of the most simple: hand washing before entering and after exiting 
a patient’s room. Yet we also know that many hospital workers don’t wash 
their hands appropriately. As a recent article in the Lancet documented, it 
is not simply ignorance or laziness that keeps workers from using the soap 
and water or hand-sanitizing gel available in hospitals—when, that is, it is 
made available. The lapse also has to do with work organization. The article 
reported that understaffing and too much emphasis on patient throughput 
supersede hand washing even when indicators point to the acute need for 
more of it. Frontline staff are not ignorant of this problem. They know what 
discourages them from appropriately following hospital policies. As one RN 
commented tersely, “Don’t tell me about hand washing. I know all about 
universal precautions. My hands are so cracked they are painful because 
I have them in soap and water all the time.”
This RN works on a medical surgical unit where the average patient load 
is between seven and eight patients. This may help explain why her hands 
are so cracked and painful. Increasing a physician’s, nurse’s, or nurses’ aide’s 
patient load significantly increases the number of patient encounters he or 
she has per day, which in turn increases the number of times he or she must 
clean his or her hands. To wash hands correctly would eat up a significant 
amount of time. Clearly if, because of heavy workloads, hospital staff lack 
the time to wash their hands and perform assigned patient care duties and/ 
or find it too painful, they won’t wash their hands.
Frontline workers may also be the only ones who can identify how insti­
tutional financial priorities are impacting the success of patient safety initia­
tives. Once again the issue of hospital cleanliness comes to mind. Cleanliness 
doesn’t involve only washing one’s hands or discarding gowns and gloves in 
the proper place. It involves the basic cleaning activities that Florence Night­
ingale identified over 150 years ago at the military hospitals in Scutari during 
the Crimean War. What is usually considered to be the prototypical example 
of “mindless” work can have lethal consequences if not done properly. Yet a 
number of studies have highlighted the fact that devaluation and outsourcing
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of this kind of work have increased hospital-acquired infections, not to men­
tion worker injuries and illness.10
The sociologist Dan Zuberi, for example, has analyzed the impact of 
a trend that began in the United States and has swept hospital systems all 
across the globe. The job of cleaning the hospital is no longer performed 
only by staff employed, trained, and controlled by the hospital but has been 
outsourced to private for-profit contractors. These contractors often try to 
save money and increase profit by skimping on the number of workers they 
hire, failing to train workers adequately to do their work safely, and even fail­
ing to provide them with adequate cleaning supplies. Zuberi states: “In an 
era in which about one in ten patients will suffer from a hospital- acquired 
infection, it is more important than ever that hospitals invest in the train­
ing of adequate numbers of cleaning staff. In fact, by disinvesting in clean­
ing through outsourcing, hospitals are doing the opposite.”11 In his research 
Zuberi has found that managers frequently lose control over every step of 
the process. In many hospitals they can no longer choose whom to hire, 
what kind of training staff get, the number of staff assigned, or the kinds of 
chemicals used.
Zuberi explains that infection control nurses, who used to meet and work 
regularly with housekeeping staff to provide them with training and super­
vision or to address critical issues, are no longer able to work directly with 
housekeepers because they are no longer working directly for the hospital. 
“When cleaning workers work for outside contractors whose main mission is 
to maximize profit, patients suffer,”12 Zuberi says. Using contract employees 
often leads to reduced communication with nursing and clinical staff, since 
they are accountable not to the hospital but instead to their contract supervi­
sor. As an article in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine describes the 
situation in Great Britain “‘outsourcing’ of services such as hospital cleaning 
has produced a demoralized, exploited workforce and a management that has 
lost touch with what the job entails.”13
Loss of control over the process of keeping hospitals clean can compro­
mise any and every patient safety initiative that is proposed and implemented. 
Indeed, this loss of control jeopardizes the very mission of the hospital as 
well as the fundamental ethical promise of physicians and nurses to “first 
do no harm.” Problems are also caused by the lack of clear, appropriate 
procedures for these staff, on the assumption that “everyone knows how 
to clean a room.” Making sure that these phenomena do not jeopardize the 
nonnegotiable aspects of patient care will require discussing workload and 
working conditions with workers who often fail to capture the attention and 
imagination of elite experts.
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These and other workers can also help us understand the roles that time, 
energy, and burnout play in the implementation of patient safety. Over the 
past decade or more, health care has seen a flood of patient safety dictates not 
only from regulators or accreditors but also from outside consultants coming 
into the workplace to reorganize, restructure, or reengineer work processes. 
In one large Manhattan teaching hospital, the chief nursing officer recalled 
that over a period of ten years, almost the same number of consultants made 
their way into and out of the hospital, each with a contradictory way of orga­
nizing care, creating teams, or structuring work processes. These consultants 
entered hospitals in a whirlwind of promises and activity but rarely stayed 
around long enough to implement changes or evaluate what had happened 
to patient care and the hospital workforce as a result.
Patient safety has also become part of this flavor-of-the-month consul­
tant trend. One week some staff may be asked to attend trainings in Crucial 
Conversations led by Vital Smarts, teamwork trainings given by NDelta, or 
Top Gun (founded by former airline pilots), or Six Sigma or Toyota Lean 
Production, delivered by yet another cohort of consultants. Hospitals are the 
site of initiatives pioneered by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, one 
of the leaders in the patient safety movement. Over the past several years the 
IHI has launched the 5 Million Lives campaign, which began as the 100,000 
Lives campaign. Its website lists programs like the State Action on Avoid­
able Rehospitalization (STAAR), or W HO Surgical Safety Checklists,14 with 
new initiatives announced sometimes on a weekly basis. In nursing there is 
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s Transforming Care at the Bedside, 
and the American Nurses Credentialing Center’s Magnet hospital move­
ment, as well as the American Association of Critical Care Nurses’ Healthy 
Workplace Initiative. Every one of these initiatives demands time and energy 
from frontline staff. The crucial questions here are: Are units allocated 
enough staff, and are staff given enough time to absorb and master these new 
activities—activities that are too often an add-on to an unadjusted workload? 
How can these activities be financially sound investments for hospitals? How 
can they be seen as important critical investments that will reduce outcomes 
such as medical errors, lawsuits, and length of stay for patients?
The time and energy required by the introduction of new technologies 
that are discussed in chapters by Koppel and his colleagues also complicate 
the patient safety picture. Depending on an individual’s age and computer 
literacy, mastering these technological changes takes a great deal of time and 
effort. Often, staff need to manage both the old system and the new system 
while technological bugs are ironed out. Again the question arises: Are staff 
given enough time, and is their workload adjusted so they can master these
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technologies? If not, the sheer number of initiatives that workers are asked 
to implement and absorb can result in the kind of “consultant fatigue” that 
may, in turn, lead to cynicism.
Frontline workers can be very helpful in identifying how much time it 
will really take to deal with new initiatives and their accompanying techno­
logical demands, as well as in suggesting how staffing levels and workload 
need to be adjusted so that workers can change practice. Frontline staff, 
Edmondson writes, must also have the time to do second-order problem 
solving, not just first-order “workarounds,”15 whereby a problem is not 
effectively resolved but instead a temporary solution is implemented in order 
to resolve the immediate issue. Unfortunately, current staffing patterns leave 
workers little time to do more than the latter—engaging in time-consuming 
workarounds. This failure to consider long-term solutions is not merely 
rewarded on hospital units; it is embedded in medical and nursing education.
“The topic of improving patient safety and problem solving in terms of 
organizational and system issues are rarely taught in nursing and medical 
[schools],” commented Dr. George Thibault, president of the Josiah Macy Jr. 
Foundation, which supports the development of a clinical education—reform 
curriculum in medical and nursing schools.16 When programs for health 
care administrators and middle managers tackle the issue of patient safety, 
they tend to focus on problem-solving tools but not the processes and skills 
needed to engage the workforce in activities to identify critical problems 
and to assist in implementing changes. When hospital staff are promoted out 
of the ranks of frontline workers and into the ranks of management—when 
RNs become nurse managers, for example— the hospital generally fails to 
teach them the kind of coaching and team-building skills that are key to 
patient safety. As one nurse manager expresses it, “If we were able to figure 
out how to involve fronthne staff sooner, we would be able to improve our 
performance—not just improve our performance, but improve performance 
faster.”17 Furthermore, they are certainly not part of the training of workers 
on the lower rungs of the health care ladder—workers who, because of class, 
race, and ethnicity, are unlikely to be asked to participate in problem-solving 
and decision-making activities when it comes to patient safety. This is ironic, 
since these workers tend to be long-term employees who know firsthand 
about systems that work and those that don’t.
Frontline staff must also be involved in patient safety initiatives because 
they are the ones who directly experience the unintended consequences or 
glitches of safety initiatives. We know that unintended consequences are 
common outcomes of well-intentioned projects. High-risk, high-reliability 
industries that have successfully changed their cultures have long recognized
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that safety requires a lot of trial and a lot of error. You can’t work out the 
glitches, however, if the people who can best identify them are not encour­
aged to speak up and/or aren’t heard when they do.
Citing just one of these glitches, Krishna Collie, a consultant who works 
with the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Washington, D.C., com­
ments: “A common breakdown is that computer systems for outpatient, 
inpatient, and specialist and primary care doctors using EMRs [electronic 
medical records] don’t talk with each other. Many of these problems could 
be controlled if not eliminated if [hospital] staffs had been included in the 
selection of vendors and the actual software that is used.”18 Many physicians 
and nurses report that they are evaluated on their display of enthusiasm for 
newly installed health information technology (HIT). Koppel elaborates:
Even though they experience significant problems with HIT that has 
profound negative patient safety implications, many doctors and nurses 
say that they are discouraged from reporting these problems. If they 
fail to show enthusiastic support for HIT or report problems, they 
risk being labeled “technophobes” or “troublemakers.” Rather than 
acknowledging that the technology has problems that require remedy, 
doctors and nurses are accused of being dumb, technophobic, or in­
competent. In this way dangers to patient safety are allowed to propa­
gate, workers become increasingly frustrated, and the software is not 
improved.19
Failing to include frontline workers in hospital initiatives is clearly docu­
mented in an influential article by Harvard Business School professors Anita 
Tucker and Amy Edmondson, “Why Hospitals Don’t Learn from Failures.” 
They write, “Front-line employees in service organizations are well posi­
tioned in these efforts to help their organizations learn, that is, to improve 
organizational outcomes by suggesting changes in processes and activities 
based on their knowledge of what is and is not working.”20 Or as John le 
Carre expressed in a more literary vein in his novel Absolute Friends, “in a 
mammoth bureaucracy obsessed with its own secrecy, the fault lines are best 
observed by those who, instead of peering down from the top, stand at the 
bottom and look up.”21
Backstage Attitude Change
The most promising patient safety initiative involves more than a techni­
cal fix or a brilliant campaign slogan. Patient safety, like any other cultural 
transformation, involves changing attitudes and not just changing behavior.
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Changing attitudes, however, is not simply a matter of individuals acquiring 
the right information and then applying it under the watchful eyes of an 
alert expert or manager. Changes in attitudes and beliefs occur in the web 
of social relationships in which individuals reside. As David Dickinson has 
pointed out in his excellent book on HIV/AIDS prevention, Changing the 
Course of AIDS: Peer Education in South Africa and Its Lessons for the Global Cri­
sis, changing behavior involves a complex interplay between the front stage, 
backstage, and private spaces.22 These terms are taken from Erving Goffman, 
who, in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959), described human 
interaction as a performance that is executed in a variety of spaces-—front 
stage, backstage, and private.23 Elite actors, the proverbial experts, generally 
occupy the front stage spaces, where they give performances and hand down 
information, advice, and recommendations. They expect their audience of 
less elite players to accept this information and adjust their behavior accord­
ingly. Actors who are barely recognized by experts as “players”—or, in the 
new health care jargon, as “stakeholders”— occupy backstage and private 
spaces. In front stage spaces the powerless or lower-level player may often 
seem to assent to or comply with the powerful. In private or backstage spaces, 
to which the powerful do not have access, the less powerful say what they 
really think and act upon their true beliefs and feelings.
In the hospital or patient safety movement, front stage spaces would 
involve conferences like those conducted by the IHI, or seminars given 
inside or outside the hospital by prominent patient safety experts or hospital 
higher-ups. Backstage spaces would include the hospital ward and even the 
patient’s room, which managers will try to penetrate through a variety of 
championship efforts or management by walking around. Private spaces 
include the nurses’ station, lunchroom, staffroom, hospital corridor, locker 
room, and so forth. These are the “cultures” that Porter and Edmondson 
refer to in quotations cited earlier.
What one learns in the culture of backstage and private spaces is key to 
both attitude and behavioral change, for example, the role played by demor­
alization and burnout in workers’ responses to patient safety initiatives. As we 
said earlier, over at least the past decade and a half, hospital management has 
hired a raft of consultants to help cut costs and reengineer hospitals. These 
cost-cutting efforts have largely targeted frontline staff such as nurses, as well 
as cleaners and other nonclinical workers. During this period, hospital work­
ers have also fought for a clear and structured process to work jointly with 
management on patient safety activities, bans on mandatory overtime for 
RN staff, safe nurse-to-patient staffing ratios, safe needle technology to pre­
vent the spread of HIV/AIDS and other blood-borne pathogens, safe lifting
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technology, the reduction of medical errors, the use of appropriate checklists 
for critical procedures, and the creation of increased teamwork among doc­
tors and nurses, among other goals. With few exceptions, hospital manage­
ment has resisted these efforts.
Many hospital staff members are thus deeply suspicious of what they 
perceive to be hospitals’ sudden embrace of “safety,” when, in their view, 
they have been pleading with hospitals to attend to the safety of both their 
patients and their workers for years. In the private spaces of our interviews, 
one health care union leader put it this way: “Our attitude is, really, you 
care about safety? Where were you when we were trying to get safe needle 
technology to protect patients and us? Now you blame staff for not caring 
enough about patient safety. Is something wrong with this picture?” Or as 
Diane Sommers, whom we met at the beginning of this chapter, explains: 
“We can’t even get off the wards to attend safety rounds. Our hospital will 
just not allocate the financial resources to things like staff that help make 
patient safety a reality. So when I hear about a new patient safety initiative, 
I just sigh and roll my eyes.”24
The same is true of the outsourced hospital cleaner or food service worker. 
According to Polly Toynbee, author of Hard Work: Life in Low-Pay Britain, 
“when you combine low pay, low regard and high turn-over what you get is 
a hospital industry in which there is no loyalty to its outsourced employees 
and no loyalty of outsourced employees to the institution in which they 
work. This can be a toxic brew when it comes to patient care and safety.”25
In backstage and private spaces, workers also express their concerns about 
the impact of patient safety initiatives on their perceived status and authority. 
Just as airline pilots at the beginning of the airline safety movement in the 
1980s believed that cockpit (later crew) resource management programs were 
an industry effort to erode their authority,26 many frontline staff are con­
cerned that patient safety initiatives are really wolves in sheep’s clothing. One 
nurse who was highly critical of the impact of patient restructuring voiced 
concern about efforts to utilize the SBAR (situation, background, assessment, 
and recommendation) technique to enhance communication between doctors 
and nurses. “This is just a way to deprofessionalize nursing,” she insisted.27 
Other nurses have objected on similar grounds to, for example, asking two 
nurses to check IV medication administration. Many nurses are concerned 
about the computerization of bedside nursing and the introduction of medi­
cation administration records and PDAs (personal digital assistants). As Kop- 
pel and his colleagues highlight in chapter 4, their concerns are warranted. If 
there is no institutional vehicle—no attempt to create the psychological sense 
of safety that is a prerequisite for institutional learning—through which staff
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are made to feel comfortable about voicing their concerns and working to 
make technology and other safety initiatives not only helpful to patients but 
also worker friendly, staff may continue to resist such initiatives.
Under these circumstances, resistance, which is all too often viewed as 
an irrational fear of change, may in fact be a rational response to a poorly 
planned and executed patient safety agenda. If hospital executives and patient 
safety advocates are to succeed in transforming institutional culture, they will 
have to understand the limitations of top-down approaches and the impor­
tance of working in backstage and private spaces. New knowledge obtained 
through frontline staff involvement is also critical to arriving at appropriate 
and sustainable solutions.28 Organizations able to encourage and capture this 
knowledge can go on to achieve breakthrough changes and thus effectively 
improve the quality of the services they provide.
In addition to their generating new knowledge, co-workers are the only 
ones who can navigate backstage and private spaces by lowering resistance 
to any ill-conceived and autocratic dicta from above. When one co-worker 
leads another because that co-worker has been involved in the planning of 
initiatives, he or she can recognize what a peer understands, what informa­
tion peers need, what beliefs have to be challenged, what hostilities or resent­
ments need to addressed and overcome, and how best to negotiate them.
Why Unions Must Be Involved
Many hospital administrators and patient safety advocates are well aware 
of the successes of the safety movement in aviation and frequently cite the 
literature of crew resource management (CRM) in discussions of patient 
safety.29 Yet there is one aspect of CRM that is consistently downplayed: 
union involvement in the creation of an aviation safety culture was central 
to its success.
At United Airlines, the first major commercial airline company to initiate 
CRM training, top-level management began its change initiative with the 
full participation of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). When cockpit 
resource management morphed into crew resource management, the Asso­
ciation of Flight Attendants (AFA) participated in trainings and their imple­
mentation. “The industry has learned that we are integral to a successful 
safety process. They would never contemplate going back to the old way,”30 
says Keith Plagy, a safety officer for ALPA. ALPA continues to work with 
management to design and conduct the training for all flight crews. It is also 
responsible for helping to monitor safety problems of the airline industry. 
“The involvement of ALPA has been critical to the success of our safety pro­
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gram,” Hagy continues. “The unions have helped to make sure the approach 
we used was practical and relevant, and they helped to create a process that 
their members would trust since they were critical players in the process. If 
they were not involved, there would still be issues of whether or not employ­
ees would trust this process.”31 Just as it was critical to the creation of a safety 
culture in the aviation industry, the involvement of union leadership and 
activists is similarly critical to changing culture in health care. In many areas 
of the United States, aides, janitors, unit clerks, and a variety of other health 
care workers are represented by trade unions. Almost 20 percent of hospital 
RNs are in unions, as are many licensed practical nurses (LPNs) and nurses’ 
aides. In some locales, even medical residents are unionized.32
In a workplace that is unionized, engaging union leaders is one of the 
most viable routes to mobilizing the support and input of frontline staff. In 
hospitals that are unionized, many frontline staff—particularly those who 
are the most vocal, active, and motivated to help with change activities (pre­
cisely the kind to be the “black belts” or “champions” of change)—may feel 
greater loyalty to their union than they do to hospital management. As we 
said earher, since the endless cutbacks and restructuring that began in the 
1990s, many workers are deeply suspicious of hospital management. They 
believe that the C suite does not represent their interests or the interests of 
patients. Involving union leaders and activists can help overcome the belief 
that projects pitched as efforts to increase patient safety are in reality ploys to 
increase productivity from the health care workforce.
Another reason why union participation is critical is that unions can pro­
tect workers from either actual reprisals or the fear of reprisals. If reporting 
problems is the key to addressing them, then protecting those who report 
problems is essential. In the aviation industry, protecting workers who report 
safety concerns has been critical to enhancing safety for both passengers and 
crew.33 Many lower-level workers, however, are very concerned that their 
reward for identifying patient safety problems will be disciplinary procedures 
or even being fired.
In unionized settings, frontline staff, which at times can include supervi­
sors, are protected from reprisals as a result of collective bargaining agree­
ments with management. (For instance, workers cannot be fired without 
just cause, such as documentation of clear violation of safety procedures.) 
Unions can protect members from the all too common dangers facing 
frontline workers who champion safety in nonunion hospitals. To cite just 
one example, a veteran nurse at Huntington Memorial, a nonunion hospital 
in Pasadena, California, was recently fired when she tried to challenge an 
intern s order to ventilate a patient on a busy medical unit. Not only did she
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lose her job, but also she was disciplined by the State Board of Nursing. An 
even more recent case is the trial in 2010 of nurses in Texas who reported a 
physician to the medical board and were brought up on felony charges as a 
result.34 Incidents like these do not help to assuage workers’ fears, and prevent 
them from becoming fearless patient safety champions.
Soliciting the input of unionized frontline workers is particularly impor­
tant since they may be the only ones who are able to discuss candidly the 
unintended consequences of patient safety initiatives. Ironically, managers 
who are responsible for implementing patient safety initiatives may not be 
comfortable identifying significant and troublesome problems for fear of 
being reprimanded or even fired. “Many times management sees critical 
patient safety problems but fear that their job is at risk if they identify a 
specific problems that upper management would prefer to ignore,” says a 
vice president for human resources at a hospital in the Northeast. “I had this 
happen to me. I am now more reluctant to share significant patient safety 
problems with upper management for fear of losing my job.”33 This is why 
managers must also be protected if patient safety is to become a reality.
The fact is that hospital administrators who have put their reputations 
on the line by spending millions on hiring consultants and/or purchasing 
new technologies may not want to hear that these are not working as well as 
expected. Under current conditions, where nonunionized workers, both staff 
and managers, are employees “at will” (meaning they can be fired without 
just cause) and there are no guaranteed protections for speaking up and iden­
tifying specific problems in the workplace, the sad truth is that many workers 
and managers are fired if they voice concerns about significant patient safety 
problems which management is unwilling to address.
Another way in which unions can be extremely helpful is their ability to 
create education and funds for hospitals to train frontline staff and manag­
ers in effective methods to improve patient safety. Often it is difficult to 
create needed training and education just for one hospital. But if multiple 
hospitals can be persuaded to contribute to a common fund, important train­
ing and education activities are possible. Two significant examples of this 
arrangement are the 1199/SEIU and League of Voluntary Hospitals Train­
ing and Upgrading Fund in New York City, and the Worker Education and 
Resource Center in Los Angeles established by SEIU local 721. Both of 
these educational centers were created by unions to provide hospitals with 
educators and trainers to assist in the development of patient safety programs. 
These educational centers have provided hospitals in New York City and 
Los Angeles with thousands of dollars in training funds. Unions can also be 
helpful in working with management to obtain local, federal, and private
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foundation funds for patient safety projects, since hospital reimbursements 
will increasingly be based on higher levels of quality of care and patient safety, 
and it is clear to many of these funders that training and education activities 
for frontline staff and supervisors are needed to improve patient safety out­
comes. Lobbying for training, education, and pilot projects is another positive 
way for unions to work with hospitals. Through these activities, health care 
unions can help expand access to politicians, state and federal agencies, and 
foundation staff to which management alone does not have access. This is 
because health care unions represent a large numbers of workers from mul­
tiple worksites and thus have larger constituencies than management com­
monly has.
Finally, given the fact that so many of us resist change no matter where it 
begins or ends, enlisting every single ally in the cause seems not just simple 
common sense but something one would avoid at one’s—and at patients’— 
peril. In workplaces where union members are active, they can become sig­
nificant advocates for making the change to a safety culture. Given their 
insistence on recruiting stakeholders and on the power of informal leaders, 
one wonders, therefore, why managers and safety advocates do not spend 
more time and energy recruiting union leaders and activists in their efforts 
for cultural change.
Why Frontline Workers and Unions Are 
Not Sufficiently Involved in Patient Safety
In a study conducted by Peter Lazes and other researchers at Cornell Uni­
versity and the University of North Carolina School of Nursing at Chapel 
Hill, hospital staff in charge of quality and/or performance improvement 
at thirty-one U.S. hospitals were interviewed. The researchers wanted to 
ascertain if—as well as how—frontline staff were involved in patient safety 
and quality-of-care activities. All of these hospitals had received some sort 
of publicity, accreditation, or award which suggested that hospital manage­
ment was deeply committed to engaging frontline staff in quality and safety 
activities within the hospital. The researchers asked four primary questions: 
To what extent is your hospital involving frontline staff in improvement 
activities? How are they involved in these activities? What have been the 
outcomes? And what role have unions had in these improvement activities?
In spite of their reputations and awards, there seems to be a disconnect 
between the public stance and reality at these hospitals. Many of those inter­
viewed indicated that frontline staff were only marginally involved in prob­
lem solving and had almost no role in identifying problems in the first place.36
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If, for example, a hospital was trying to reduce central line infections, the 
researchers asked about the extent to which frontline staff were involved 
with devising solutions to the problem. Moreover, and perhaps more disturb­
ingly, frontline staff had almost no role in implementing safety efforts like 
these. Only 17 percent of hospitals engaged frontline staff in both problem 
identification and implementation activities. For the most part, only nurses 
were engaged in such activities. When hospital workers were represented 
by unions, they were active partners in only some cases and were often not 
included in monitoring and seeking ways to improve the impact of safety 
and improvement processes. Indeed, all too often they were sidelined. The 
researchers were concerned with improving the accuracy of information 
about frontline staff engagement. Although interviews were conducted with 
only one staff person involved with the hospitals quality or safety activities, 
it was nonetheless clear that the level of frontline staff involvement in these 
cases of excellence was limited. Perhaps the most significant thing research­
ers uncovered was the fact that management rarely consulted frontline staff 
about daily patient care issues, concerns, or problems, nor did they ask staff 
for suggestions for improvement. Even in the few cases where frontline 
staff were involved in identifying problems, they were not involved in imple­
menting solutions.37
The exclusion of frontline workers is often the result of managerial and 
professional attitudes. Hospitals are not only some of the most complex 
but also some of the most hierarchical institutions in industrialized society. 
Organized into rigid, stratified groups, hospital professionals and workers are 
divided by both financial and professional status. These sharp divisions are 
reflected in traditional hospital language. Doctors are called “chief medi­
cal officer” or “house officer,” and they issue “orders” to other hospital 
employees as well as patients. Lower-level workers, such as nurses, are termed 
“physician extenders.” Physicians and managers consider themselves to be 
the designated problem identifiers and solvers. They are the mindful leaders 
who deliver dictates to workers who do what has often been characterized 
as “mindless” work.38
Trained and referred to in their higher-level role in the health care hier­
archy, many managers and physician leaders do not believe that workers have 
anything to add to their own knowledge of the big picture. “I don’t see 
a need to involve frontline staff. They don’t know enough about the real 
problems,” is a familiar “leadership” refrain. Kamilla Kohn Roadberg, an 
international management consultant who works for Odhe and Company 
in Gothenburg, Sweden, notes that it is the job of management “to create 
needed procedures to improve patient safety and by so doing reduce the
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variances in how actual work gets done. This approach is at the core of [the] 
lean manufacturing process, which has not proven to be an effective process 
of improving health care delivery problems by itself.”39
Instead of exploring ways to engage frontline staff in the initial stages of 
planning and development of patient safety processes, the most common 
approach in hospital management today is the recruitment of management 
staff who are assigned to find solutions to specific patient safety problems. 
Referred to as “champions,” “black belts,” “ambassadors,” and “internal 
consultants,” they are picked by upper-level management and assigned the 
mission of creating appropriate solutions to a variety of problems—solutions 
that line management are then required to implement.
This top-down approach is promoted by the many consultants who offer 
their services to hospital administrators. One has only to Google any one of 
these terms—“champions,” “internal consultants,” “black belts”—to unleash 
an avalanche of advertisements posted on consultants’ websites that will tell 
you where, and how much you have to pay, to get patient safety advice, 
information, and training. The American Academy of Management, the 
American Hospital Association, and the Institute for Healthcare Improve­
ment all encourage an approach that concentrates on creating more and more 
champions, black belts, quality fellows—the list seems endless. The price 
of their services, seminars, and conferences makes it clear that the audience 
most consultants target is composed of physician leaders, upper-level, and 
sometimes middle-level management. Rarely are frontline staff and unions 
involved.
This top-down approach often produces dismay and resentment in many 
staff. One nurse at a northeastern teaching hospital described upper-level 
managements efforts to encourage hand washing in her institution. A hand 
washing initiative was designed and implemented at the top, and then a 
managerial hand washing “champion” walked around the units rewarding 
staff members with a box of Skittles if he saw them comply with hand wash­
ing policies. “It was like we were a bunch of children whom they could 
pacify by giving out a box of cheap candy,” an RN commented.40 Not only 
did frontline staff resent the fact that they weren’t involved in the design and 
implementation phase, but also they were deeply offended at being treated 
like children rather than adult professionals. These resentments were never 
directly made known to managers but were heartily expressed in private 
spaces.
From our observations, top-level leaders may at times solicit ideas from 
staff. One common practice is to conduct interviews, create a team, and sur­
vey staff about initiatives that have already been decided. Frontline workers,
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however, are rarely included in the overall design of patient safety processes. 
Once initiatives are designed, workers are then cajoled or exhorted to comply 
with new practices or activities. Like the patient who either acquiesces or 
refuses to do what the doctor orders, workers become either “compliant,” 
and thus good, or “noncompliant,” and thus difficult, and are blamed or 
disciplined for their failure to obey.
Even when frontline staff are recruited to join patient safety initiatives, 
the choice of staff tends to be limited to RNs. Patient safety, however, “is 
not simply nursing’s work, it is the work of the whole organization,” says a 
CEO in a study of frontline staff involvement.41 Depending on the specific 
nature of a particular problem, other clinical staff, physicians and house 
staff, respiratory therapists, social workers, pharmacists, lab techs, and non- 
clinical staff such as housekeeping and food services need to be engaged. 
As another chief nursing officer (CNO) at a hospital steeped in patient 
safety activities comments, “I wish we could have done more in a multi­
disciplinary fashion. We tend to hand off pieces to each other and work 
in silos. Nurses themselves are very involved, but a lot [of] what happens is 
beyond just the nurse.”42
If the positive potential of frontline staff is too often ignored, the potential 
of unions as allies in the patient safety project is ignored even more so. In 
Europe, unions are viewed as critical “stakeholders” in any workplace activ­
ity. Important social partners, they help ensure that the voice of workers is 
part of public discourse, and they play a central role in lobbying for fund­
ing of hospitals and other health facilities. Reflecting traditional American 
management’s hostility to unions, many health care employers view unions as 
hostile at worst and obstructive at best. “The feeling is that unions add to the 
complexity of an already complex job,” observed a chief nurse executive of a 
major hospital.43 As Gordon has written in an article analyzing nurse manag­
ers’ attitudes toward unions, nursing executives and even nursing academics 
often socialize nurses and managers to view union leaders and activists as 
spiders catching flies or manipulative militants trying to dupe goodhearted 
but ultimately mindless prey. At best unions are considered a necessary evil, 
at worst the devil incarnate.44
“They [unions] have no awareness of management’s difficulties. They 
just cause us problems,” echoes a middle manager at a hospital in the North­
east.45 “We actively keep them out of our hospitals, and if they were present, 
we would keep them out of any organized patient safety process,” adds an 
officer of a northeastern hospital association. “They can only cause prob­
lems for us.”46 Other administrators think that including unions in plan­
ning and implementing needed changes takes too much time. “We need to
112 FIRST, DO L E S S  HARM
make important changes now and cannot wait for everyone to be consulted,” 
remarked one administrator.47
In our work and discussions with managers and union staff, these senti­
ments were repeated over and over again. One physician at a major teaching 
hospital in Boston, which has been an exemplar of patient safety activity, 
remarked: “I have been very surprised about their [patient safety leaders’] 
attitude toward bringing the union on board when it comes to patient safety 
initiatives. People will sit around and talk about something and then some­
one will say, ‘Oh, the union won’t like that.’ And I say, ‘Well, did anyone ask 
the union?’‘No.’‘Is anyone going to?’‘No.’”48 In the United States there tends 
to be an untested assumption that unions will invariably be an obstacle rather 
than an ally in any positive transformation.
It is not surprising, then, that union leaders say they are often excluded 
from the planning, implementation, and evaluation of safety initiatives. One 
RN union representative at a Massachusetts teaching hospital described her 
frustration at the failure of management to consult the union about safety 
initiatives: “They seem to consider us to be an obstacle. We are not advised 
about safety initiatives before they happen. When, after the fact, we come 
into the process, it’s often in a backdoor way to put out fires or fix problems 
that didn’t have to happen in the first place.” This nurse gave the following 
example. To make sure that RNs practice safely, her hospital decided that 
they would have to be tested to prove their competence. To do this, the 
nurses were given a test on medication administration. Seventeen percent 
of the nurses flunked the test. Why? According to this union representative, 
it was because the test asked them questions about areas and medications 
with which they had no familiarity. “ Psych nurses were asked about cardiac 
meds,” she recounted.
They don’t give cardiac meds. I was given the test, and I haven’t passed 
meds in ten years. The nurses were told that if they flunked the test 
three times, they would be fired. But they weren’t given any review or 
teaching. We [the union] suggested that they get some classes going to 
help our nurses get more familiar with medications that are needed for 
cardiac patients. Some nurses haven’t taken a test since they passed their 
boards twenty years ago.
Finally, management agreed to these classes after a whole day of bargaining to 
arrive at this solution. “Without the union rep, many would have continued 
to flunk the test. Did the hospital consider that it would then lose hundreds 
of nurses? We had to play catch-up and then try to fix the problem. When 
we were bargaining we asked management, ‘Did you ever think that you
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could have a floor where five nurses flunked the test and only one nurse 
passed? W ho’s going to be giving the medication?”’49
Cathy Stoddart, vice president of health care for the Pennsylvania chap­
ter of SEIU, summed up: “It is quite frustrating. We see problems affecting 
patient care on a daily basis . . . but rarely have a chance to help manage­
ment solve them.”50 Stoddart decided to move beyond her frustration and 
started a quality improvement process at Allegheny Medical Center, where 
she works. She got several managers to join her and other union leaders to 
establish patient care committees in all of the hospital’s medical-surgical 
units. But most frontline staff don’t have Stoddart’s confidence and may 
not feel comfortable trying to push management to listen to their ideas and 
suggestions.
Far too many unions, as we stated earlier in this chapter, are not invited 
to participate in patient safety programs. “Many times managers keep us 
at a distance; they don’t value our input,” comments David Schildmeier of 
the Massachusetts Nurses Association.51 “We have participated on various 
quality and safety committees, but our suggested solutions don’t get imple­
mented. When we have gotten involved, many times members’ ideas often 
get voted down without attempts at genuinely analyzing their merits. This 
is not only discouraging members from participating in these activities, but 
puts union leaders at risk for suggesting that it is important to work with 
management on such issues,” says Schildmeier.52 “Why should we put out 
when they won’t accept our advice? I have better things to do with my 
time,”53 says Michael Chacon, organizer for the New York State Nurses 
Association (NYSNA), expressing a common frustration. “In our hospital, 
management has established a parallel performance improvement and profes­
sional development process to our partnership structure. This parallel process 
reduces our ability to help improve the safety of patients and leaves our mem­
bers questioning the value of our activities with management,” says Janet 
McCarthy, staff nurse and negotiating team member at Allegheny Medical 
Center.54
To be fair, unions have not always been proactive enough about involv­
ing themselves in certain patient safety agendas and initiatives. While it is 
tfue that some nursing unions have fought for transformations in work 
organization and working conditions that would definitely improve patient 
care—bans on mandatory overtime, safe staffing, safe needle technology and 
lifts—union involvement in patient safety issues more generally may be too 
limited.55 “We need to be part of the process to improve patient care,” com­
ments Mary Lehman McDonald, director of the American Federation of 
Teachers’ (AFT) health care division.
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Most of our members don’t have grievances or labor relations issues 
[traditional areas for the union], but instead they want a voice in what 
goes on with patients. We as union leaders need to^help use our in­
fluence to improve their ability to have input in activities to improve 
patient care. It is no longer just management’s responsibility to be con­
cerned with patient care and safety and costs. We have always been 
concerned about these issues but most of our work was focused on the 
traditional work of the union [such as handling grievances, negotiat­
ing contracts, and organizing new members]. There now needs to be 
a much broader balancing of these activities; we too need to expand 
our areas of work.56
Rick Brooks, executive director of UNAP, the Rhode Island nurses’ union, 
acknowledges:
Frankly at times, we have not pushed our way into patient safety im­
provement work. We know that there are quality and safety com­
mittees organized in many of the hospitals where we have members, 
but we have been reluctant to get involved; we decided to stay on the 
sidelines. We have resisted getting involved in these activities. To some 
extent this has been caused by being comfortable in just doing our 
traditional union work. And to some extent we have been hesitant to 
learn new skills. Why change? Things are pretty good for now. Also, it 
is discouraging for us to have to fight our way to be heard by manage­
ment and then get ignored. Many of our members feel that improv­
ing patient safety is a critical part of our responsibility as health care 
workers but many times question the value of needing to spend hours 
convincing management to listen to us.57
Nursing unions, as is pointed out in chapter 9 by Alison Trinkoff and 
Jeanne Geiger-Brown, have also taken some contradictory positions on 
patient safety. Unionized nurses have fought for bans against mandatory 
overtime on the grounds that it is not safe for nurses to work more than 
one shift, but have defended nurses’ right to work as many shifts in a row 
and as many hours as they want, as long as working more than eight hours is 
voluntary, not mandatory. When advised that the safety literature documents 
that errors increase after eight hours on the job and escalate dramatically after 
twelve, the union response tends to be that “nurses like twelve-hour shifts.” 
Obviously unions and their members can’t have it both ways. If it’s unsafe 
to work more than twelve hours when they are mandated to do so, it’s also 
unsafe for them to work more than twelve hours voluntarily.58
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How Involving Frontline Staff—and Their 
Unions—Makes a Difference
In this chapter we argue that it is necessary to create a fundamentally differ­
ent patient safety template. Creating that template can produce impressive 
results. Maimonides Medical Center in Brooklyn has been successful at cre­
ating a safer hospital environment because it has involved both unions and 
frontline workers.
Maimonides Medical Center has seven hundred in-patient beds and 
employs over six thousand workers, who are represented by three unions: 
1199/SEIU, which represents non-nursing staff; New York State Nurses 
Association (NYSNA), which represents registered nurses; and the Com­
mittee of Interns and Residents (CIR). The hospital, like most others in the 
country, has had its share of patient safety problems. A cardiology patient 
had died because staff “did not seem to respond to monitors and alarms 
in a timely manner.” The hospital was not consistently kept clean. Hospital 
administrators and staff were also concerned about patient falls, among other 
medical errors and injuries.
CEO Pamela Brier, cited earlier in this chapter, comments that the hos­
pital attempted to deal with a variety of safety issues in the past, but with 
limited success. In 1997 the hospital finally took a different approach. Rather 
than initiate safety efforts from above, it formed a labor-management joint 
process with the three unions and established what became known as a “Stra­
tegic Alliance.” The purpose of the alliance was to ensure that labor and man­
agement worked together to improve patient care and to increase employees’ 
input in decision making. This would, the hospital hoped, have a positive 
impact on employee recruitment and retention.
The alliance established a hospital-wide Labor-Management Council as 
well as Departmental Labor-Management Committees (DLMCs). To deal 
with the problems that were occurring on all of the cardiology units, the 
alliance went into action. Before the union, management, and frontline 
workers began to meet, management had contemplated disciplining nursing 
staff “because they were not responding to monitors and alarms in a timely 
fashion” Instead, the cardiology DLMC began to investigate why staff— 
particularly nursing staff—response time to monitors and alarms fluctuated 
between two and a half and eight minutes rather than the minute or less 
required to rescue patients successfully.
To understand this discrepancy fully, the twenty-member DLMC decided 
to do an in-depth analysis of what was going wrong on its units. For five 
months, registered nurses, patient care technicians, information specialists,
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physician assistants, nurse practitioners, nurse managers, physicians, nurse 
educators, performance improvement specialists, and a resident met weekly. 
Staff from departments such as Patient Transport, Radiology Health Infor­
mation Technology (HIT), and Materials Information Systems (MIS) also 
attended when needed.
The DLMC group began by tracking patients’ trajectory into and out of 
the hospital. This detailed analysis illuminated a number of serious problems. 
Acuity (severity of illness) measure of patients was not uniformly established 
or adequately understood. Thus, the proper numbers of RNs and nursing 
assistants were not assigned to care for patients. Patients were transferred 
to other departments—say, X ray—without a knowledgeable licensed staff 
member accompanying them. If a patient’s condition deteriorated off-unit, 
people there were not always equipped to help. At change of shift, informa­
tion about patient acuity was not conveyed to the next cohort of caregivers, 
precluding effective coordination of care. Finally, the DLMC discovered that 
staff did not know how to make simple adjustments to medical equipment, 
which meant that minor problems would often sideline a piece of equipment.
Because frontline employees from all shifts participated—including 
attending physicians and nurse practitioners—workers felt far more com­
fortable expressing their real concerns and making suggestions. The group 
was therefore able to get an accurate picture of the problem and propose 
solutions that had been designed with the involvement of these different 
groups. The solutions—to which all disciplines and occupational groups 
agreed—included:
• Establishing new clinical protocols to define patient acuity correctly.
• Making sure all patient acuity is assessed on a daily basis.
• Communicating acuity assessments in daily rounds with all staff, in­
cluding physicians, to ensure accurate staffing levels.
• Including information on acuity in shift-to-shift reports on patients 
and making sure that acuity information is in the patient’s chart.
• Establishing a new procedure to ensure that patients would be ac­
companied by a licensed practitioner when they leave the unit for 
tests, and involving patient transport in the implementation of the 
procedure.
• Creating the same standard for individualized alarm settings, checking 
the settings at the start of a new shift, and using the same standards on 
all four cardiology units.
• Providing more training on equipment to make sure it operates prop­
erly.
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• Retraining nurses in how to set alarms and suspend a monitor without 
disabling others.
• Creating a logging system for tracking equipment failure and repairs, 
as well as tracking when patients left and returned to their floor.
Once these solutions were agreed on, DLMC members and nurse educa­
tors trained all staff, including physicians, on new procedures and protocols, 
and the group designated an RN and a nursing assistant to monitor the 
implementation of all changes to make sure all solutions were implemented 
and sustained. As one nurse involved in the effort remarked: “What was the 
tipping point for us was when we realized that blame for these problems was 
no longer automatically assigned to nurses, that other disciplines were ready 
to accept accountability for problems and help solve them. That made all 
the difference.”59
Because the group understood that patient safety depends on sustain­
ing solutions over the long term, it continues to meet, collects data about 
response time and new procedures each month, and reviews reports from 
each unit to determine whether or not gains have been maintained. If the 
data show that staff are having problems continuing to follow the proce­
dures just listed or response times to alarms exceed one minute, the DLMC 
analyzes the particular situation and makes recommendations for needed 
changes. As a result of the multidisciplinary, all-encompassing work of the 
cardiac staff, the response time to monitors fell to less than one minute on all 
four cardiology units and has remained at this level.
At Maimonides, frontline staff were also involved in improving hospital 
cleanliness. When Pamela Brier was a patient in her own hospital, she discov­
ered that the hospital simply wasn’t clean enough. To deal with this problem, 
five staff members (four cleaners and one supervisor) were relieved of their 
regular duties and assigned to work as a Study Action Team. For four months 
their full-time job was to interview staff, analyze work processes on all three 
shifts, and visit other hospitals to check on their procedures and equipment. 
They also engaged nursing staff, physicians, unit coordinators, and various 
administrators throughout the hospital to gather their ideas and concerns 
about unit and hospital-wide cleanliness.
Again, the fact that the group was made up of cleaners, not just managers, 
allowed members to enter backstage and private spaces and to understand 
the actual work processes and concerns of those whose job it is to keep the 
hospital clean. What the Study Action Team discovered when it looked at 
the problems of the environmental services departments was that staff lacked 
the requisite equipment and supplies because the inventory system that
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should have made sufficient supplies available didn’t function effectively. 
For example, all supplies were rarely available at the beginning of shifts 
for employees. There also wasn’t enough cleaning staff, particularly on the 
graveyard shift, which in turn created problems for workers on day and 
afternoon shifts. As a result, morning or afternoon staff would come into a 
room or corridor and discover that garbage hadn’t been removed, as it should 
have been on a previous shift. The group also identified another important 
issue. Even though many workers had been employed as hospital cleaners for 
a number of years, some weren’t adequately trained in how to keep the hos­
pital clean. As a result, cleaning staff weren’t really sure if a room was clean 
and couldn’t turn rooms around quickly enough for new patients. Moreover, 
housekeeping and nursing staff didn’t communicate well with each other. 
Thus housekeepers often didn’t know which rooms needed to be cleaned 
urgently and which less so.
Rather than rely solely on standard hospital satisfaction surveys, such as 
Press-Ganey scores, to help address these problems, the Study Action Team 
developed its own survey instrument to determine whether patients’ rooms as 
well as all public areas and nursing stations were cleaned in a timely fashion. 
Members of the Study Action Team were responsible for making sure that 
staff had the appropriate training not only in housekeeping skills but also in 
infection control and dealing with bodily fluids and chemical hazards. The 
team was also responsible for helping to establish a new process for purchas­
ing cleaning equipment and supplies. In addition, it took responsibility for 
negotiating with management, particularly around issues of staffing on the 
graveyard shift. The team also worked on developing more effective com­
munication between nursing and housekeeping staff.
As a result of these activities, Maimonides is now a cleaner and safer hospi­
tal. Moreover, these joint efforts did not end with cleanliness and changes on 
the cardiology units, but continues to target a variety of patient safety prob­
lems. The decision to involve frontline staff and unions on an ongoing basis 
produced not only a genuine group of allies but also an ability to strategize 
continuously about crucial patient safety and worker safety issues. It uncov­
ered not only problems and solutions but also aspects of work organization 
that needed to be changed to sustain safety over the long term.
Another important example of a major patient safety initiative that involved 
frontline staff took place throughout the Veterans Affairs health care system. 
Beginning in October 2007, acute care hospitals in the VA system addressed 
one of the most vexing hospital-acquired infections—methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). Efforts to reduce incidence of the infection 
had stalled at the VA, and researchers and clinicians recognized the need to
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act more assertively and effectively to decrease MRSA infections. The VA 
thus implemented what it called a “MRSA” bundle,” which included a num­
ber of different activities: “universal surveillance, contact precautions, hand 
hygiene, and institutional culture change was associated with a decrease in 
health care—associated transmissions of and infections with MRSA in a large 
health care system.”60
During the study period, all patients admitted to a VA acute care 
hospital had their nose swabbed to test for the presence of the MRSA 
organism. If a patient tested positive, that patient was then isolated. Hand 
hygiene— critical to the spread of infection but sometimes not sufficiently 
practiced—was emphasized in each facility, but it was done in a way that 
encouraged culture change by making “infection control the responsibility 
of everyone who had contact with the patient.” The results of the study 
were dramatic. Between October 2007 and June 2010, rates of health care- 
associated MRSA infections in ICUs decreased by 62 percent and in non- 
ICUs by 45 percent.
According to Dr. Rajiv Jain, principal investigator on the study, the early 
and consistent engagement of frontline staff to ensure prevention of the 
spread of infection was key to the success of this effort. Jain commented: 
“In our view, frontline staff are the experts. On in-patient units, they provide 
care everyday 24/7. You can have all the policies and procedures you want 
on the books, but the practice staff follow in delivering care is what makes 
the difference between safe and unsafe care.”
To make sure that staff followed hand hygiene policies and procedures, it 
was critical to talk with staff to understand why some people use the proper 
hygiene and some don’t. “Complexity science,” Jain explains, “teaches us 
that knowledge does not equal practice because there are lots of filters that 
impact whether knowledge becomes practice.” As Jain points out, it is hard 
to find anyone who works in health care who does not know that hand 
hygiene is the single most important mechanism to fight the spread of infec­
tion in hospitals. That said, not everyone who “knows” follows policy when 
it comes to hand hygiene. Why not? “By engaging frontline staff,” says Jain, 
“we began to understand the barriers to practice and to understand how 
some people overcome those barriers.”
Next Jain and his colleagues held focus groups with staff. Unlike typical 
focus groups, these were not led by an outside consultant or by a physician 
or other institutional leader. “The staff who do it correctly were the ones 
who led the discussion,” Jain says. “They explained to their co-workers and 
colleagues how they overcome the barriers they experienced. That was what 
led to positive behavior change.”
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Another aspect of their project that reinforced this kind of positive change 
was universal testing. Some experts claim that testing everyone who comes 
into a hospital is too expensive and unnecessary. Jain and his colleagues dis­
agree. They believe that universal testing has both a clinical and a behavioral 
rationale. From the clinical point of view, testing anyone who is going to be 
admitted helps the hospital discover who does and who does not carry the 
MRSA organism. Jain says:
Obviously there is a scientific reason to test people. That is to find out 
whether the patient has the organism. This allows you to make clinical 
decisions, hke whether to place them in isolation. But there is another 
reason to test patients. When, in the process of admitting a patient, the 
staff are doing the swab test, this becomes a reminder that they need to 
do all the things they need to do to prevent the spread of the organism.
Testing serves as a reminder, and reminders, Jain notes, are very important 
in real life. “I think of testing hke I think of signs that remind us of the speed 
limit that’s posted on a highway When we see the sign we remember that 
maybe we ought to slow down. Without that reminder we might continue 
speeding and eventually hurt someone.” Although Jain and his colleagues did 
not scientifically test this particular hypothesis-—that universal testing acts 
as a reminder that in turn leads to improvements in practice— they firmly 
believe that is the case.
As Robert Reich, secretary of labor in the Chnton administration, has 
argued, in the new global economy, the workers whom policymakers focus 
on today are the symbolic analysts, the so-called knowledge workers, who 
have captured the biggest share of global wealth.61 Gone are the manufac­
turing jobs and blue-collar workers of old. In the contemporary universe, 
the ones who matter are the professionals with minds that can manipulate 
facts, data, and the latest management theory. Our society, as Mike Rose has 
pointed out in his excellent book The Mind at Work, is now strictly divided 
into mindful and mindless work. In a twenty-first-century version of early- 
twentieth-century Taylorism, the frontline worker in an office, hospital, or 
nursing home is often viewed as a mindless worker who is managed by those 
who have the minds and the knowledge to do so.
Although health care is a shining temple of twenty-first-century tech­
nology, much of the realpolitik of health care management and policy is 
grounded in classic Taylorist perceptions of the division of labor, updated 
superficially to address pressures for return on investment, profit maximiza­
tion, and production speed-ups. Just as the early-twentieth-century factory
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owner would not have consulted his workers about better automobile design, 
few contemporary hospital administrators (rhetoric about teams and inclu­
sion notwithstanding) consult their nurses or other workers about how to 
provide more effective and safer patient care.
It is thus hardly surprising that some in the modern patient safety move­
ment reproduce and reinforce this paradigm. As we have argued, workers at 
the bottom of the totem pole are not viewed as having the kind of knowl­
edge that is truly valued. Although there is a great deal of rhetoric about the 
need to involve frontline staff, the definition of involvement is all too often 
limited to bringing staff on board solely to ensure compliance with programs 
that have been designed without their input. Managerial and professional 
attitudes toward frontline staff can, in fact, create a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
If higher- level professionals such as physicians or top-level managers see 
themselves as “the designated problem solvers” for departmental and inter­
departmental problems, they won’t consult frontline staff. If frontline staff 
are never consulted, they can never develop the kind of confidence needed to 
address controversial issues. If and when they are asked to offer their ideas or 
suggestions, they may be so intimidated by the education and “expertise” of 
those above them that they hesitate to contribute. If they are suddenly given 
leadership roles, without any prior training in how to fulfill those roles, they 
may fail. If they are reluctant to contribute good ideas, are silent when finally 
asked to sit at the table, or fail to act in a leader-like manner, physicians or 
managers may consider them to be useless time wasters. “Why are they here 
at all,” one physician asked in frustration after a meeting in which RNs sat 
silently around a table. The RNs spoke to us about some excellent ideas after 
the meeting was over, but they were hesitant to share their knowledge openly 
in a very physician-dominated hospital. Rather than delve into the reasons 
for the nurses’ silence, the elite simply decided to exclude them from future 
meetings. This in turn convinced nurses that doctors never listen to them and 
are not interested in their concerns and insights, which simply reinforced the 
cycle of reluctance and resistance.
Similar resistance is created when managers, administrators, and safety 
researchers and advocates neglect the safety problems identified by front­
line staff (safe lifting, needle-stick injuries, work overload, long hours and 
lack of sleep, access to medical records and lab results, coordination with 
other departments, and so on). In a similar vein, managers often focus 
on regulations and scores—patient satisfaction scores, Medicare payments 
for hospital-acquired problems, and Joint Commission requirements— and 
ignore worker concerns. All of the problems that managers and workers 
identify are important. They are not, however, given equal weight on the
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patient safety agenda and in the priorities of hospital administration. Nor 
are they always integrated into the agenda of unions as representatives of 
frontline workers.
We are arguing here for a fundamentally different paradigm—one that 
recognizes that frontline workers and the unions that represent them can 
have a positive role to play in resolving patient safety problems as well as 
in contributing to a comprehensive patient safety program. It is not only 
their compliance that matters but also their insights, their knowledge, and 
yes, their mindfulness. Recognition of their mindfulness when it comes to 
patient safety must begin at the beginning, in the identification of patient 
safety problems, and continue in the design of methods to resolve them; 
the implementation of those programs and processes; the follow-up; and 
recurrent training, evaluation, and constant refinement of these programs and 
processes. Education and training not of but with frontline workers, manag­
ers, and other hospital players is crucial. So is the kind of recurrent training 
in safety methodology and practice that has made the airline industry safety 
movement so successful.
Culture changes not through episodic intervention but through con­
stant repetition and reiteration. Safety training sessions, safety conferences, 
seminars, and webinars should, therefore, target not only physicians, nurses, 
and administrative leaders but also other frontline workers, who should not 
merely attend such conferences but actually present at them. Imagine the 
message that would be delivered to frontline staff (not just RNs) if they were 
asked to speak at such events and were offered educational materials and dis­
counts to attend such conferences and seminars. Making such participation 
possible by including their comments in programs and making participation 
affordable is critical for those whose jobs are located at the point where the 
rubber of patient safety meets the road of patient care practice.
Currently our country is involved in various activities to make needed 
reforms of our health care system. No matter where this discussion leads, 
health care cannot be reformed without a fundamental reconsideration of 
the way frontline workers influence the fate of people once they enter the 
health care system and become patients within it. Nor is reform possible 
unless the health and safety of frontline staff is considered to be part of, not 
apart from, the patient safety agenda.
